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Abstract
In this work, we discuss in detail a flaw in the original security proof of the W-
OTS+ variant of the Winternitz one-time signature scheme, which is an important
component for various stateless and stateful many-time hash-based digital signature
schemes. We update the security proof for the W-OTS+ scheme and derive the
corresponding security level. Our result is of importance for the security analysis of
hash-based digital signature schemes.
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1 Introduction
Many commonly used cryptographic systems are vulnerable with respect
to attacks with the use of large-scale quantum computers. The essence of this
vulnerability is the fact that quantum computers would allow solving discrete
logarithm and prime factorization problems in polynomial time [1], which
makes corresponding key sharing schemes and digital signatures schemes
breakable. At the same time, there exist a number of mathematical oper-
ations for which quantum algorithms offer little advantage in speed. The
use of such mathematical operations in cryptographic purposes allows de-
veloping quantum-resistant (or post-quantum) algorithms, i.e. cryptographic
systems that remain secure under the assumption that the attacker has a
large quantum computer. There are several classes of post-quantum crypto-
graphic systems, which are based on error-correcting codes, lattices, multi-
variate quadratic equations and hash functions [2].
Among existing post-quantum cryptographic systems, hash-based signa-
ture schemes [3] attracted significant attention. This is easy to explain since
the security of hash-based cryptographic primitives is a subject of extended
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research activity, and hash functions are actively used in the existing cryp-
tographic infrastructure. One of the main components of their security is
as follows: For hash functions finding a pre-image for a given output string
is computationally hard. Up to date known quantum attacks are based on
Grover’s algorithm [4], which gives a quadratic speed-up in the brute-force
search. Quantum attacks, in this case, are capable to find (i) preimage, (ii)
second preimage, and (iii) collision, with time growing sub-exponentially with
a length of hash function output. Moreover, the overall performance of hash-
based digital signatures makes them suitable for the practical use. Several
many-time hash-based digital signatures schemes are under consideration for
standardization by NIST [5] and IETF [6,7].
We note that still the cryptographic security of hash-based digital signa-
tures is a subject of ongoing debates, so security proofs for such schemes
regularly appear (see e.g. [8–14]). These studies are partially focused on
the security of basic building blocks of many-time hash-based digital sig-
natures, which are one-time signature scheme. In particular, a variant of
the Winternitz signature scheme, which is known as W-OTS+ is considered.
The original security proof for the W-OTS+ scheme is presented in Ref. [8],
and the W-OTS+ scheme is used in XMSS(-MT) [7], SPHINCS [9], Gravity
SPHINCS [12], and SPHINCS+ [11] hash-based digital signatures. The secu-
rity of many-time digital signatures obviously depends on the security level
of the used one-time signature scheme.
In this work, we study the security of the W-OTS+ signature scheme. We
identify security flaws in the original security proof for W-OTS+, which lead
to the underestimated level of the security. We modify the security analysis
of the W-OTS+ scheme.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce necessary definitions and
notations as well as describe the W-OTS+ scheme in Sec. 2. In Sec. 3 we
provide a detailed updated security analysis of the W-OTS+ and discuss its
differences from the previous version. We conclude in Sec. 4.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 One-time and many-time hash-based signatures
The Winternitz one-time signature (W-OTS) [15,16] has been introduced
as an optimization of the seminal Lamport one-time signature scheme [17].
In order to use such one-time signature in practice several its modifications
have been discussed. In particular, the W-OTS+ scheme has received a sig-
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nificant attention in the view of standardization processes, in which one of
the candidates is the XMSS signature that uses the W-OTS+ [5].
It order to use hash-based digital signatures in practice one should make
them usable for many times. In order to do so it is possible to use Merkle
trees. Using a root of the tree one can authenticate public keys of many one-
time signature. This idea is used in several many-time hash-based signatures
based on the W-OTS+ scheme. The security of many-time digital signatures
clearly depends on the security level of the used one-time signature scheme.
The original security proof for the W-OTS+ scheme is presented in Ref. [8].
We note that there are other modifications of the W-OTS scheme (e.g.
see [6, 18]), however they are beyond the scope of the present paper.
2.2 Definitions and notations
We start our discussion with introducing basic definitions and notations
also used in Ref. [8]. Let x $← X denote an element x chosen uniformly
at random from some the set X. Let y ← Alg(x) denote an output of the
algorithm Alg processed on the input x. We write log instead of log2 and
denote a standard bitwise exclusive or operation with ⊕, d·e and b·c stand
for standard ceiling and floor functions.
Definition 1 (Digital signature schemes). Let M be a message space. A
digital signature scheme Dss = (Kg, Sign,Vf) is a triple of probabilistic poly-
nomial time algorithms:
– Kg(1n) on input of a security parameter 1n outputs a private key sk and
a public key pk;
– Sign(sk,M) outputs a signature σ under secret key sk for message M ∈
M;
– Vf(pk, σ,M) outputs 1 iff σ is a valid signature on M under pk;
such that ∀(pk, sk)← Kg(1n),∀(M ∈M) : Vf(pk, Sign(sk,M), sk) = 1.
Consider a signature scheme Dss(1n), where n is the security parameter.
A common definition for the security of Dss(1n), which is known as the
existential unforgeability under the adaptive chosen message attack (EU-
CMA), is defined using the following experiment.
Experiment ExpEU−CMADss(1n) (A)
(sk, pk)← Kg(1n).
3
(M ?, σ?)← Asign(sk,·)(pk).
{(Mi, σi)}qi=1 be the query answers for Sign(sk, ·).
Return 1 iff Vf(pk, σ?,M?) = 1 and M ? /∈ {Mi}qi=1.
In our work we consider one-time signatures, so the number of allowed quires
q is set to 1.
Let SuccEU−CMADss(1n) (A) = Pr
[
ExpEU−CMADss(1n) (A) = 1
]
be the success probability
of an adversary A in the above experiment.
Definition 2 (EU-CMA). Let t, n ∈ N, t = poly(n), Dss(1n) is a digital
signature scheme. We call Dss EU− CMA-secure if the maximum success
probability InSecEU−CMA(Dss(1n), t) of all possibly probabilistic adversaries
A running in time ≤ t is negligible in n:
InSecEU−CMA(Dss(1n); t) def= max
A
{
SuccEU−CMADss(1n) (A)
}
= negl(n).
We then consider proof of the EU-CMA property for the W-OTS+ scheme
on the basis of the assumption that the scheme is constructed with the func-
tion family having some particular properties. Let us discuss these required
properties in detail.
Consider a function family Fn = {fk : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n}k∈Kn, where Kn
is some set. We assume that it is possible to generate k $← Kn and evaluate
each function from Fn for given n in poly(n) time. Then, we require three
basic security properties for Fn: (i) it is one-way (OW), (ii) it has the second
preimage resistance (SPR) property, and (iii) it has the undetectability (UD)
property.
The success probabilities of an adversary A against OW and SPR of Fn
are defined as follows:
SuccOWFn (A) =
Pr[k
$← Kn, x $← {0, 1}n, y = fk(x), x′ ← A(k, y) : y = fk(x)] (1)
and
SuccSPRFn (A) =
Pr[k
$← Kn, x $← {0, 1}n, x′ ← A(k, x) : (x 6= x′) ∧ (f(x) = f(x′))], (2)
respectively. By using these notations, we introduce the basic definitions of
OW and SPR.
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Definition 3 (One-wayness and second preimage resistance of a function
family). We call Fn one-way (second preimage resistant), if the success prob-
ability of any adversary A running in time ≤ t against the OW (SPR) of
Fn is negligible:
InSecOW(SPR)(Fn; t) def= maxA {Succ
OW(SPR)
Fn (A)} = negl(n). (3)
To define the UD property we first need to introduce a definition of the
(distinguishing) advantage.
Definition 4 (Advantage). Given two distributions X and Y we define the
advantage AdvX ,Y(A) of an adversary A in distinguishing between these two
distributions as follows:
AdvX ,Y(A) = |Pr
[
1← A(X )]− Pr [1← A(Y)]|. (4)
Consider two distributions DUD,U and DUD,Fn over {0, 1}n × Kn. Sam-
pling of an element (u, k) from the first distribution DUD,U is realized in the
following way: u $← {0, 1}n, k $← Kn. Sampling of an element (u, k) from the
second distribution DUD,Fn is realized by sampling k $← Kn and x $← {0, 1}n,
and then setting u = fk(x). The advantage of an adversary A against the UD
of Fn is defined as the distinguishing advantage between these distributions:
AdvUDFn (A) = AdvDUD,U ,DUD,Fn(A). (5)
Definition 5 (Undetectability). We call Fn undetectable, if the advantage
of any adversary A against the UD property of Fn running in time ≤ t is
negligible:
InSecUD(Fn; t) def= maxA {Adv
UD
Fn (A)} = negl(n). (6)
2.3 The W-OTS+ signature scheme
Here we describe the construction of the W-OTS+ signature scheme. First
of all, we define basic parameters of the scheme. Let n ∈ N be the security
parameter, andm be the bit-length of signed messages, that isM = {0, 1}m.
Let w ∈ N be so-called Winternitz parameter, which determines a base of
the representation that is used in the scheme. Let us define the following
constants:
l1 =
⌈
m
log(w)
⌉
, l2 =
⌊
log(l1(w − 1))
log(w)
⌋
+ 1, l = l1 + l2. (7)
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By using the described above function family Fn, we define a chaining func-
tion cik(x, r) for x ∈ {0, 1}n, r = (r1, . . . , rj) ∈ {0, 1}n×j, and j ≥ i ≥ 0 as
follows:
c0k(x, r) = x, c
i
k(x, r) = fk(c
i−1
k (x, r)⊕ ri) for i > 0. (8)
In what follows ra,b is a substiring (ra, . . . , rb) of r if b > a or it is an empty
string otherwise.
Now we are ready to define the basic algorithms of the W-OTS+ scheme.
Key generation algorithm (Kg(1n)) consists of the following steps:
1. Sample the values
k
$← K, r = (r1, . . . , rw−1) $← {0, 1}n×(w−1). (9)
2. Sample the secret signing key
sk = (sk1, . . . , skl)
$← {0, 1}n×l. (10)
3. Compute the public key as follows:
pk = (pk0, pk1, . . . , pkl) = ((r, k), c
w−1
k (sk1, r), . . . , c
w−1
k (skl, r)). (11)
Signature algorithm (Sign(M, sk, r)) consists of the following steps:
1. Convert M to the base w representation: M = (M1, . . . ,Ml1) with
Mi ∈ {0, . . . , w − 1}.
2. Compute the checksum C =
∑l1
i=1(w − 1 −Mi) and its base w repre-
sentation C = (C1, . . . , Cl2).
3. Set B = (b1, . . . , bl) = M ||C as the concatenation of the base w repre-
sentations of M and C.
4. Compute the signature on M as follows:
σ = (σ1, . . . , σl) = (c
b1
k (sk1, r), . . . , c
bl
k (skl, r)). (12)
Verification algorithm (Vf(M,σ, pk)) consists of the following steps:
1. Compute (b1, . . . , bl) as it is described in steps 1-3 of the signature al-
gorithm.
2. Do the following comparison:
pki
?
= cw−1−bik (σi, rbi+1,w−1), i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. (13)
If the comparison holds for all i, return 1, otherwise return 0.
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We assume that the runtime of all three algorithm is determined by the
evaluation of fk, while time, which is required for other operations, in negli-
gible. Thus, the upper bound on the runtime of Kg, Sign, Vf is given by the
value of lw.
3 Security of W-OTS+
3.1 Security proof
In this section we consider the security proof of the W-OTS+ scheme. The
general line of our proof coincides with the one from Ref. [8]. However there
are important differences, which yield another expression for the resulting
security value.
Theorem 1. Let n,w,m ∈ N and w,m = poly(n). Let Fn = {fk :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n}k∈Kn be a one-way, second preimage resistant, and unde-
tectable function family. Then, the insecurity of the W-OTS+ scheme against
an EU-CMA attack is bounded by
InSecEU−CMA(W-OTS+(1n, w,m); t, 1)
< lw · (w · InSecUD(Fn; t˜) + InSecOW(Fn; t˜) + w · InSecSPR(Fn; t˜)) (14)
with t˜ = t+3lw+w−2, where time is given in number of evaluation function
from F .
Proof. The proof is by contrapositive. Suppose there exists an adversary A
that can produce existential forgeries for W-OTS+(1n, w,m) scheme by run-
ning an adaptive chosen message attack in time ≤ t with the success proba-
bility εA ≡ SuccEU−CMAW-OTS(1n,w,m)(A).
Then we are able to construct an oracle machineMA that either breaks
the OW or SPR of Fn using the adversary algorithm A. Consider a pseudo-
code description ofMA in Algorithm 1 and block scheme in Fig. 1(a).
The algorithm is based on the following idea. We generate a pair of W-
OTS+ keys, and then introduce OW and SPR challenges in the αth chain,
where the index of the chain α, position of the OW challenge β, and position
of the SPR challenge γ are picked up at random [see also Fig. 1(b)]. Then
we submit a modified public key pk′ to A. The adversary can ask to provide
a signature for some message M . If the element bα calculated from M is less
than β, that is it locates below our challenge yc, then we are not able to
generate a signature and we abort. Otherwise, we compute the signature σ
with respect to our modified public key and give it to A. Finally, we obtain
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some forged message-signature pair (M ′, σ′), and if the forgery is valid then
σ′ eventually contains the solution for the one of our challenges. Otherwise
MA return fail.
Algorithm 1:MA
Input : Security parameter n, function key k, OW challenge yc and SPR challenge xc.
Output: A value x that is either a preimage of yc (i.e. fk(x) = y) or a second preimage
for xc under fk (i.e. f(xc) = f(x) and x 6= xc) or fail.
1 Generate W-OTS+ key pair: (sk, pk)← Kg(1n)
2 Choose random indices α $← {1, . . . , l}, β $← {1, . . . , w − 1}
3 if β = w − 1 then
4 set r′ = r
5 else
6 Choose random index γ $← {β + 1 . . . w − 1}
7 Set r′ = r and replace r′γ by c
γ−β−1
k (yc, rβ+1,w−1)⊕ xc
8 Obtain modified public key pk′ by setting pk′0 = (r′, k), pk
′
i = c
w−1
k (ski, r
′) for
1 ≤ i ≤ l, i 6= α, and pk′α = cw−1−βk (yc, r′β+1,w−1)
9 Run ASign(sk,·)(pk′)
10 if ASign(sk,·)(pk′) queries to sign message M then
11 Compute B = (b1, . . . , bl) which corresponds to M
12 if bα < β then
13 return fail
14 Generate signature σ of M with respect to the modified public key:
i. Run σ = (σ1, . . . , σl)← Sign(M, sk, r′)
ii. Set σα = c
bα−β
k (yc, r
′
β+1,w−1)
15 Reply to the query using σ
16 if ASign(sk,·)(pk′) returns valid (σ′,M ′) then
17 Compute B′ = (b′1, . . . , b′l) which corresponds to M
′
18 if b′α ≥ β then
19 return fail
20 else if β = w − 1 or cβ−b′αk (σ′α, r′b′α+1,w−1) = yc then
21 return preimage cw−1−b
′
α−1
k (σ
′
α, r
′
b′α+1,w−1)⊕ rβ
22 else if x′ = cγ−b
′
α−1
k (σ
′
α, r
′
b′α+1,w−1)⊕ rγ 6= xc and
c
γ−b′α
k (σ
′
α, r
′
b′α+1,w−1) = c
γ−β
k (yc, rβ+1,w−1) then
23 return second preimage x′ = cγ−b
′
α−1
k (σ
′
α, r
′
b′α+1,w−1) + r
′
γ .
24 else
25 return fail
26 else
27 return fail
We start with computing the success probability ofMA in solving one of
the challenges. Let ˜A be a probability that Algorithm 1 execution comes to
the line 17. More formally, it can be written as follows:
˜A = Pr[βα ≥ β ∧ “Forgery is valid” ∧ b′α < bα], (15)
where the event “Forgery is valid” stands for (1 ← Vf(pk;σ′;M ′)) ∧ (M ′ 6=
8
yccβ(sk1,r)k
xc
cγ(sk1,r) c
γ-β(sk1,rβ+1,w-1)
r
γ rγ
r1
...
... ...
... ...
...
...
...
...
...
...
c1(sk1,r)k
sk1
pk1 pkα
cβ(sk1,r)k
cγ(skl,r)
r
γ
r1
...
...
...
c1(skl,r)k
skl
pkl
α
β
γ
fk fk
fk fkfk
... ...
Prepare (sk,pk) pair, 
include challenges in pk’,
pass pk to  the Adversary
Signature reqest
is answeable (b
α ≥ β)?
Valid forgery occured
(Vf(pk,σ’,M’)→1, M’≠M)
Preimage of yc 
appeared in chain?
Yes
No
Forgery appeared in the 
required level (b’
α < bα)?
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Collison appears at
the position γ?
Yes
No
No
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Return fail
Return fail
Return fail
Return fail
Return 
preimage of yc 
Return second 
pre-image for xc 
(a) (b)
’’’
Figure 1: In (a) the block scheme of MA is depicted. A bullet marks a point for UD
challenge. In (b) an introducing image and second pre-image challenges in the public key
of the W-OTS+ scheme is shown.
M). We denote the whole event of Eq. (15) as “Forgery is fortunate”.
We then can consider two mutually exclusive cases: either (i) β = w − 1
or the chain started from σ′α come to yc at the βth level, or (ii) β < w−1 and
the chain started from σ′α does not come to yc at the βth level. Let these two
case realizing with probabilities p and (1 − p) correspondingly conditioned
by the event “Forgery is fortunate”.
In the first case, the adversary A somehow found a preimage for the yc.
The total probability of this event is upper bounded by InSecOW(Fn; t˜), so
we can write
p · ˜A ≤ InSecOW(Fn; t˜). (16)
The time t˜ = t + 3lw + w − 2 appears as the upper bound on the total
running time of A plus each of the W-OTS+ algorithms Kg, Sign, and Vf
plus preparing αth chain in pk′ (see line 8 in Algorithm 1).
In the second case, we have a collision somewhere between (β+1)th and
(w − 1) level. If the collision appears at the level γ we obtain the second
preimage of xc. Since the SPR challenge was taken uniformly at random, the
value of r′γ remains to be a uniformly random variable, therefore there is no
way for A to detect and intentionally avoid the position γ. Thus, we obtain
the collision at the level γ with probability (w− 1−β)−1 > w−1 conditioned
by the event “Forgery is fortunate”. On the other hand, this probability is
upper bounded by InSecSPR(Fn; t˜). So we have
(1− p) ˜A
w
< InSecSPR(Fn; t˜). (17)
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Again, the time t˜ = t+3lw+w−2 appears as the upper bound on the total
running time of our algorithm.
By combining Eq. (16) and Eq. (17), we obtain the following expression:
˜A < InSecOW(Fn; t˜) + w · InSecSPR(Fn; t˜). (18)
In the remainder of the proof we derive a lower bound for ˜A as the
function of A. We note that in general A may behave in a ‘nasty’ way
making ˜A  A e.g. by always asking to sign ‘bad’ messages with bα < β or
avoiding forgeries in ‘good’ positions b′α > bα. In other words, the algorithm
may avoid crossing the point shown in Fig. 1(a). This behaviour of A means
that it can somehow reveal the challenge position from the modified public
key pk′. We below consider the strategy of using this possible ability of A to
break UD property.
Consider two distributions DM and DKg over {1, . . . , w− 1} × {0, 1}n×
{0, 1}n×(w−1)×Kn. An element (β, u, r, k) is obtained from DM by generat-
ing all subelements β, u, r, and k uniformly at random from the correspond-
ing sets. At the same time, an element (β, u, r, k) is obtained from DKg by
generating β, r, and k uniformly at random, but setting u = cβk(x, r) with
x
$← {0, 1}n. One can see that DKg corresponds to the generation of elements
in W-OTS+ signature chain from the secret key element up to the βth level.
Consider a pseudocode of Algorithm 2 of a machine M′A taking the
security parameter n and an element from either DM or DKg as input. One
can see that the operation ofM′A is very similar to the operation ofMA.
Given an input (β, u, r, k) from DM, M′A sets yc = u and then works
exactly as M up to line 19 of the Algorithm 1. If the event “Forgery is
fortunate” happens, then M′A returns 1. Otherwise, it returns 0. So given
an input (β, u, r, k) from DM,M′A outputs 1 with probability ˜A.
Let us consider the behavior of M′A given an input from DKg. In this
case A obtains a fair W-OTS+ public key. The probability thatM′A outputs
1 is thus given by
̂A ≡ Pr[bα ≥ β ∧ “Forgery is valid” ∧ b′α < bα]
= A · Pr[bα ≥ β ∧ b′α < bα|“Forgery is valid”]
≥ A · Pr[bα = β ∧ b′α < bα|“Forgery is valid”]. (19)
Here we used the fact that in the considered case Pr[“Forgery is valid”] = A.
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Algorithm 2:M′A
Input : Security parameter n, a sample (β, u, r, k).
Output: 0 or 1.
1 Generate W-OTS+ key pair: (sk, pk)← Kg(1n) taking bitmasks from r and a function for
chain fk instead of random ones
2 Choose random index α $← {1, . . . , l}
3 Obtain modified public key pk′ by setting pk′0 = (r, k), pk
′
i = c
w−1
k (ski, r
′) for
1 ≤ i ≤ l, i 6= α, and pk′α = cw−1−βk (u, r′β+1,w−1)
4 Run ASign(sk,·)(pk′)
5 if ASign(sk,·)(pk′) queries to sign message M then
6 Compute B = (b1, . . . , bl) which corresponds to M
7 if bα < β then
8 return 0
9 Generate signature σ of M with respect to the modified public key:
i. Run σ = (σ1, . . . , σl)← Sign(M, sk, r′)
ii. Set σα = c
bα−β
k (yc, r
′
β+1,w−1)
10 Reply to the query using σ
11 if ASign(sk,·)(pk′) returns valid (σ′,M ′) then
12 Compute B′ = (b′1, . . . , b′l) which corresponds to M
′
13 if b′α ≥ β then
14 return 0
15 else
16 return 1
Then we can write
Pr[bα = β ∧ b′α < bα|“Forgery is valid”]
= Pr[bα = β|“Forgery is valid”] · Pr[b′α < bα|bα = β ∧ “Forgery is valid”]
(20)
and consider each term of the RHS in detail. Let X be a random variable
equal to a number of elements in the requested W-OTS+ signature σ which
lie above the zero level, which is conditioned by the fact the the forgery
produced by A is valid (if one gives σ to A). More formally we define X as
follows:
X = |{i : 1 ≤ i ≤ l, bi > 0}| conditioned by “Forgery is valid”. (21)
Since α and β are chosen at random from the sets {1, . . . , l} and {1, . . . , w−
1} we have
Pr[bα = β|“Forgery is valid”] = X
l(w − 1) >
X
lw
. (22)
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Then, since the forged message M ′ has at least one element in its signature
σ′ which went down through its chain compared to the signature σ, and this
element is certainly among X elements, we have
Pr[b′α < bα|bα = β ∧ “Forgery is valid”] ≥
1
X
. (23)
Taking together Eqs. (19), (22), (23), and putting the result into Eq. (19) we
obtain
̂A >
A
lw
. (24)
By the definition, the advantage of distinguishing DM DKg by M′A is
given by
AdvDM,DKg(M′A) = |˜A − ̂A|. (25)
Using the obtained bound (24) and expanding absolute value in Eq. (25) we
come to the following upper bound on A:
A < lw ·
(
AdvDM,DKg(M′A) + ˜A
)
. (26)
The remaining step is to derive an upper bound of AdvDM,DKg(M′A) using
the maximal possible insecurity level of the UD property. For this purpose
we employ the hybrid argument method. First, we note that
AdvDM,DKg(M′A) =
w−1∑
β′=1
1
w − 1AdvDβ=β′M ,Dβ=β′Kg (M
′A), (27)
where Dβ=β′M and Dβ=β
′
Kg denote distributions with fixed first subelement β =
β′. Expression (27) leads to the fact that there must exist at least one value
β? such that
AdvDβ=β?M ,Dβ=β
?
Kg
(M′A) ≥ AdvDM,DKg(M′A). (28)
Then we define a sequence of distributions {Hi}β
?
i=0 over {1, . . . , w − 1} ×
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}n×(w−1) × Kn, such that an element (β, u, r, k) is generated
from Hi by setting
β = β?, x
$← {0, 1}n, u = cβ?−ik (x, rj+1,w−1), (29)
and sampling r and k uniformly at random from the corresponding spaces.
One can see that H0 and Hβ? coincide with Dβ=β
?
Kg and Dβ=β
?
M , correspond-
ingly. So, Eq. (28) can be rewritten as follows:
AdvHβ? ,H0(M′A) ≥ AdvDM,DKg(M′A). (30)
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The triangular inequality yields the fact that there must exist two consecutive
distributions Hi? and Hi?+1 with 0 ≤ i? < β? such that
AdvHi? ,Hi?+1(M′A) ≥
1
β?
AdvDM,DKg(M′A) >
1
w
AdvDM,DKg(M′A). (31)
We are ready to construct our final machine BM′A, shown in Algorithm 3,
which employsM′A to break the UD property.
Algorithm 3: BM′A
Input : Security parameter n, a sample (u, k).
Output: 0 or 1.
1 Generate r $← {0, 1}n(w−1)
2 Input n and (β?, cβ
?−(i?+1)
k (u, ri?+1,w−1), r, k) into M
′A
3 return the result from M ′A
One can see that
AdvDUD,U ,DUD,Fn(BM
′A
) = AdvHi? ,Hi?+1(M′A), (32)
since the input toM′A with (u, k) from DUD,U is equivalent to a sample from
Hi?+1, while this input to M′A with (u, k) from DUD,Fn is equivalent to a
sample from Hi?. Indeed,
c
β?−(i?+1)
k (fk(x), ri?+1,w−1) = c
β?−i?
k (x⊕ ri?, ri?,w−1) (33)
and x ⊕ ri? is indistinguishable from the uniformly random string. At the
same time, we have
AdvDUD,U ,DUD,Fn(BM
′A
) ≤ InSecUD(Fn; t˜). (34)
The runtime bound t˜ = t+3lw+w−2 is obtained as sum of time t required for
A, at most 3lw calculations of fk required in Kg, Sign, and Vf used inM′A,
and at most w− 2 calculations of fk, while preparing input forM′A in BM′A
(line 2 in Algorithm 3) and preparing αth chain inM′A (line 3 in Algorithm 2)
(the total number of fk evaluations is given by w − 1− (i? + 1) ≤ w − 2).
By combining together Eqs. (31), (32), and (34) we obtain
AdvDM,DKg(M′A) < w · InSecUD(Fn; t˜). (35)
Then putting this result into Eq. (26) we arrive at
A < lw ·
(
w · InSecUD(Fn; t˜) + ˜A
)
(36)
Finally, taking into account Eq. (18) we obtain the desired upper bound.
Remark 1. One can note that the bound t˜ = t+3lw+w−2 can be tightened
at least to t˜ = t + 3lw by firstly choosing the value α and then removing
calculation of αth chain within Kg used in MA and M′A. However, it has
almost no practical value since usually is assumed that t 4lw.
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3.2 Difference from the previous version of the proof
Here we point out main differences between our security proof and the
original proof from Ref. [8] that contains a slightly different security bound,
namely:
InSecEU−CMA(W-OTS+(1n, w,m); t, 1)
≤ wl ·max{InSecOW(Fn; t′), w · InSecSPR(Fn; t′)}+
w · InSecUD(Fn; t?), (37)
where t′ = t+ 3lw and t? = t+ 3lw + w − 1.
First of all, during the discussion ofMA, that is the same in both proofs,
it was stated that Pr[bα = β] ≥ 1w , motivated by the fact that β is chosen
uniformly at random (see p. 181 of [8]). However, as we discussed in our
proof, A may reveal the chain containing challenges, and also may always
ask to sign a message with bα = 0 thus making Pr[bα = β] = 0.
In the proof of [8] it is stated that Pr[b′α < β|“Forgery is valid”∧bα = β] ≥
l−1. This is also may not be correct if A is able to reveal the chain containing
challenges and, e.g., make forgery only with b′α = β. Actually, accounting
a possibility of hostile behavior of A forces us to introduce the “Forgery
is fortunate” event and bound its probability by employing InSecUD(. . .).
We note that our treatment also gives a different factor before the term
InSecUD(. . .).
Moreover, in Ref. [8] the obtained bound contains
max{InSecOW(. . .), wInSecSPR(. . .)} instead of InSecOW(. . .) + w ·
InSecSPR(. . .). Perhaps, it appeared by putting multiples p and (1 − p) on
the opposite side of inequalities corresponded to Eq. (16) and Eq. (17) of
the present paper.
Finally, the used different runtime bounds t′ and t? for breaking OW/SPR
and UD of Fn, however, as it is shown above they can be considered to be
the same.
Anyway, as we demonstrate below, both expressions (14) and (37) pro-
vide close levels of security. Moreover, we note that the security level of
W-OTS+ used in the security proof of SPHINCS coincides with the derived
expression (14) (see #ots term on page 382 of [9]).
3.3 Security level
Given results of the Theorem 1, we are able to compute the security level
against classical and quantum attacks. Following reasoning from Refs. [8,19],
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we say the scheme has security level b if a successful attack is expected to
require 2b−1 evaluations of functions from Fn. We calculate lower bound on b
by considering the inequality InSecEU−CMA(W-OTS+(1n, w,m); t, 1) ≥ 1/2.
We assume that
InSecOW(F(n); t) = InSecSPR(F(n); t) = InSecUD(F(n); t) = t
2n
(38)
for brute force search attacks with classical computer [3], and
InSecOW(F(n); t) = InSecSPR(F(n); t) = InSecUD(F(n); t) = t
2n/2
(39)
for attack with quantum computer using Grover’s algorithm [4]. We also
assume that t  4lw, so all runtime bounds used in (14) and (37) are the
same: t˜ ≈ t′ ≈ t? ≈ t. The results of comparison are shown in Table 1.
The new bound is smaller the previous one by log l(2w+1)lw+1 ≈ 1 bit for typical
parameter values w = 16 and l = 67.
Bound from [8] Bound from present work
Classical attacks b > n− logw − log(lw + 1) b > n− log(lw)− log(2w + 1)
Quantum attacks b > n
2
− logw − log(lw + 1) b > n
2
− log(lw)− log(2w + 1)
Table 1: Comparison of security levels for the W-OTS+ scheme.
4 Conclusion and outlook
Here we summarize the main results of our work. We have recapped the
security analysis of the W-OTS+ signature presented in Ref. [8], and pointed
out some of its flaws. Although the updated security level almost coincides
with the one from Ref. [8], we believe that our contribution is important for
a fair justification of the W-OTS+ security.
We note that a security analysis of the many-times stateless signature
scheme SPHINCS+, which uses W-OTS+ a basic primitive and which was
submitted to NIST process [11], originally was based on another approach
for evaluating the security level [10]. However, it was discovered that the
employed security analysis has some critical flaws (see C.J. Peikert official
comment on Round 1 SPHINCS+ submission [20]).
Recently, a new approach for the security analysis of hash-based signature
was introduced [14]. It suggests a novel property of hash functions, namely the
decisional second-preimage resistance, and therefore requires an additional
deep comprehensive study.
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